In January 2003, Alberto Mora, the general counsel of the United States Navy, was faced with a grave dilemma. In late 2002, Mora had become aware of allegations of physical abuse and degrading treatment of detainees held at the Guantanamo Bay detention centre. Mora was deeply disturbed by these reports. Beyond his own moral concerns, Mora believed that such mistreatment of prisoners went against what he saw as US values and violated international and domestic human rights laws. Furthermore, Mora feared that if such news reached the public, the credibility of the US government, its foreign relations, and US military strategy would suffer greatly.

Initially, Mora had believed the policy to be the result of mistakes made in the rushed post-9/11 climate. But now in January 2003, he was reading a memo by Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo, one of the most senior lawyers in the executive branch, defending the policy. Reading the memo, Mora realised that the policy had been approved at the highest-levels of the US government. If he persisted in trying to end the interrogations, he risked dismissal and could potentially harm the careers of those supporting him. Yet, he also felt that he could not turn a blind eye to the abuses – he had a duty to act and he would need the strongest case possible.

The case can be ordered as a full case or an abbreviated version.