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In June 2003, Prime Minister Tony Blair took the legal world by surprise when he announced sweeping reforms of the English justice system.

 

A key feature of these reforms was the creation of a judicial appointments commission (JAC), whose remit included appointing and promoting members of the senior judiciary.  Many felt that the reforms were long overdue.  One point of contention was the involvement of a cabinet minister in selecting senior judges. But criticisms extended beyond calls for a ‘separation of powers’. The senior judiciary was regularly accused of elitism.  Commentators often cited the fact that most senior judges were white, upper class men. Furthermore, many of these judges had practiced in the same barristers’ chambers, attended the same universities and even gone to the same fee-paying schools. These personal connections, together with a general preference for ‘elite’ candidates, were thought to be responsible for the lack of diversity among the senior judiciary.  Put simply, the popular view was that equally qualified non-elite candidates were being overlooked.

Against this backdrop, this project uses statistical techniques, popularized by labour economists, to assess the role that personal connections play in shaping the law. The first paper assesses the claim that social networks influenced promotions from the High Court to the Court of Appeal, prior to the introduction of the JAC. Further papers explore whether workplace networks have influenced the decision-making and/or the content of legal opinions of judges sitting in the Court of Appeal.

Project methodology:

To undertake this study, we collected data on every judge serving in the English Superior Courts from 1980 to 2006, a total of around 400 individuals. Using biographic annuals, we obtained a rich set of information on each of these individual’s school and university education, their subsequent legal careers, and even their preferred social clubs. Using the case law provider Westlaw UK, we tracked each case heard by these individuals from the date of their initial judicial appointment through to retirement or December 31, 2005, including all subsequent citations and appeals. This novel dataset allowed us to construct a detailed picture of the social and workplace networks within the senior English judiciary. We could then test whether connected judges were more likely to promote one another, to cite one another, or to affirm one another judgments upon appeal.

Funded by:

Partners:

Jordi Blanes I Vidal, Managerial Economics and Strategy Group, London School of Economics

Project dates